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Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?
Douglass Cassel*

I. INTRODUCTION

Does international human rights law make a difference? Does it protect rights in
practice?
The importance of these questions for rights protection is obvious: the
institutions of international human rights law deserve our energetic support only to
the extent they contribute meaningfully to protection of rights, or at least promise
eventually to do so.
Moreover, at the moment these questions have added urgency. They underlie an
ongoing debate, fomented in part by this Journal, on the extent to which the United
States should be prepared to cede degrees of its national sovereignty to international
human rights institutions, in return for their presumed benefits for rights protection.'
For example, should the US ratify the treaty to create an international criminal court
for war crimes, at the risk, however slight, that Americans might be prosecuted before
the Court?2 Similarly, should the US ratify human rights treaties with only a
minimum of reservations, rather than, as now, accepting the treaties (if at all) only to
the extent they conform to our domestic norms? And should we be willing to make
human rights treaties enforceable against our federal, state, and local governments?
The extent to which we should accommodate ourselves to these international
organizations and treaties depends in part on whether they are likely to do any good
in protecting rights globally.'
In answering these questions, international human rights law must be
understood and evaluated as part of a broader set of interrelated, rights-protecting
processes. So understood, and taking into account its still early stage of historical
* Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law:
1. See, for example, Jack Goldsmith, Should InternationalHuman Rights Law Trump US Domesti, La,., 1
ChiJ Intl L 327 (2000).
2. See, for example, Council on Foreign Relations, Toward an InternationalCriminal Coeurt (CFR 1999).
3. Compare Goldsmith, 1 ChiJ Intl L at 327 (cited in note 1), with Kenneth Roth, T: Cbrade of US
Ratification ofInternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 1 ChiJ Intl L 347 (200D).
4. See Goldsmith, 1 ChiJ Intl L at 335-38 (cited in note 1).
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development, international human rights law has shown itself to be a useful tool for
rights protection. Most important are its indirect effects. International articulation of
rights norms has reshaped domestic dialogues in law, politics, academia, public
consciousness, civil society, and the press. International human rights law also
facilitates international and transnational processes that reinforce, stimulate, and
monitor these domestic dialogues. While reliable quantitative measurement is
probably impossible, by strengthening domestic rights institutions, international
human rights law has brought incalculable, indirect benefits for rights protection.
In addition, international enforcement mechanisms have more limited, but
nonetheless important, direct benefits for rights protection. They protect lives, free
prisoners, rescue reputations, prompt legislative reform, and afford otherwise
unattainable justice in the form of truth telling, reparations, and condemnation and
punishment of rights violators. Still, direct international interventions are limited in
impact. Over time, the extent to which international law serves as a useful tool for
protection of human rights will depend mainly on its contribution to a broader set of
transnational processes that affect the ways people think and institutions behave'whether governments, state security forces, guerrilla groups, or corporations.
Granted, the instrumental value of international human rights law-direct or
indirect-is not self-evident. Within the last decade alone, skeptics may cite such
breaches as the genocide of nearly one million Rwandans, the ethnic cleansing of
hundreds of thousands of former Yugoslavs, and the displacement of nearly two
million Colombians. But continued atrocities do not disprove the case for
international human rights law; the fact that it has not triumphed everywhere does
not mean that it serves no useful purpose anywhere.
Where human rights have made remarkable advances-as in the ending of
forced disappearances in Latin America and the freeing of political dissidents in
central Europe-skeptics may plausibly credit factors other than international law.
Moral outrage, we are told, sufficiently galvanizes world public opinion,6 while
internal factors such as economic collapse, economic development, democratization,
or domestic legal institutions deserve the credit for improvements in rights.
To individualize causation in this way, however, overlooks the multiple,
reinforcing interactions among parallel processes that have fueled the post-World
War II rights revolution. Articulation of norms in law, for example, is not irrelevant
to their perceived moral content. International law may shape national law. Formally
obligatory international norms can legitimize and fortify the organizing and
consciousness-raising efforts of non-governmental organizations. Their work in turn
often leads to further development of both international and national rights law.

5. Consider Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 Yale LJ 2599 (1997).
6. Goldsmith, 1 ChiJ Intl L at 338 (cited in note 1).
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Where rights have been strengthened the cause is usually not so much individual
factors acting independeny-whether in law, politics, technology, economics, or
consciousness-but a complex interweaving of mutually reinforcing processes. What
pulls human rights forward is not a series of separate, parallel cords, but a "rope" of
multiple, interwoven strands. Remove one strand, and the entire rope is weakened.
International human rights law is a strand woven throughout the length of the rope.
Its main value is not in how much rights protection it can pull as a single strand, but
in how it strengthens the entire rope.
Professor Goldsmith is thus beside the point in contending that "Nations that
increase protection for their citizens' human rights rarely do so because of the pull of
international law."7 As an example, he argues that European nations were predisposed
to protect rights, and hence were not prompted to do so by the European human
rights system. The European system, he explains, merely "provided the monitoring,
information, and focal points that assisted domestic governments and groups already
committed to human rights protections but unable to provide these rights through
domestic institutions" s But this is precisely how international law is most useful in
protecting rights-by interacting with other strands, in this case by "assist[ing]
domestic governments and groups."9
This hypothesis is amply supported by anecdotal evidence.' It is also consistent
with a number of leading schools of contemporary international relations and
international law theory." The fact that this hypothesis probably cannot be proven
empirically, given the limitations of data on human rights and the complexities of

7. Id at 337.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Skeptics might still ask whether the hypothesis can be proved empirically. Professor Go!dsmith
rightly takes international law scholars to task for "[m]ethodological fuJnsophistication. Jack

Goldsmith, Sovereignt, InternationalRelations T17wry, and InternatiornlLaw, 52 Stan L Rm- 959, 984
(2000).

11. Space does not permit analysis of the "fie'ofthe approach outlined here with leading contemporary
theories of international relations and international law. For a general discussion, see Kenneth
Abbott, International Relations Theory, InternationalLaw, and the Rcsfines GorcrningAcrcrtts in Interal
Conflicts, 93 AmJ Intl L 361 (1999) (international relations theories); Steven I Rawer and Anne-

Marie Slaughter, eds, Synposiuni on Method in International Law, 93 Am I Intl L 291 (1939)
(international law theories). In brief, the argument here that international human rights law is
effective mainly insofar as it interacts with other, related processes, is consistent with elements of
nearly all the major schools, especially the'transnational legal process" school, see Koh, 105 Yale LJ
2599 (cited in note 5), the "compliance pull" theory, see Thomas M. Franch, Lgtzy
in &z
International System, 82 Am J Ind L 705, 712, the "liberalism" school of international relations, see

Abbott, 93 AmJ Intl L at 366-67, and "constructivism," see id at 367-63. While the approach here
has little in common with the "realism" school, see id at 364-65, it shares the recognition that the
most powerful stares are least likely to be influenced by international human rights law and
institutions. See part V below (discussing variable context).
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causal analysis, is not fatal.'2 The utility of international human rights law is merely
one of many international policy questions that must rely mainly on judgment
informed by experience.
Before outlining the theory in more detail, a definition of "international human
rights law" is required. In this essay the term is used in a broad sense, to include not
only human rights treaties but also international humanitarian law, which in essence
provides more specific human rights protections in time of war. It also includes not
only formally binding treaties, but also customary international law, as evidenced in
formal international declarations and diplomatic practice. This inclusion may be
controversial. Skeptics argue that pronouncements by international bodies and
diplomats in support of human rights do not demonstrate customary international
law, in the face of widespread violations in domestic practice.13 For purposes of the
argument here, however, this inclusion is inconsequential. If international
pronouncements are not included as part of the "strand" of international human rights
law, then they may be treated simply as another strand woven into the human rights
"rope." Since what matters is the strength of the rope, and not of any individual
strand, international rights declarations play similar roles in rights protection,
regardless of how they are classified within the rope.
For purposes of this analysis, one major category of rights is excluded from the
definition of human rights, namely economic, social, and cultural rights. The question
of the efficacy of international law in protecting rights to housing, medical care,
employment and social security, all of which depend even more than civil rights on the
availability and allocation of material resources, raises separate and additional issues
beyond the scope of this analysis.

II. THE "ROPE" THAT PULLS HUMAN RIGHTS FORWARD
As one strand in the rope that pulls rights forward, the value of international
human rights law depends mainly on its interaction with the other strands. The
central strand in the rope is the global growth in human rights consciousness. This in turn
interweaves the concept of rights, as entitlements of individuals or groups on which
claims or demands may be based, together with the notion that some rights are so

12.

For an illustration of difficulties with human rights data and causality, see Douglass Cassel, InterAmerican Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in Dinah Shelton, ed, Commitment and Compliance: The

Role of Non-BindingNorms in the InternationalLegal System 393 (Oxford 2000).
13.

For a broad critique, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113 (1999). For a narrower one, see Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of
Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 Ga J Intl &
Comp L 99 (1995-96).
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fundamental they are inherent birthrights of all human beings, regardless of
nationality or culture.
Other strands of the rope include non-governmental human rights organizations,
whose numbers, activities, and sophistication in international human rights law norms
and institutions have grown dramatically at both national and international levels"'
and rapidly evolving communications and transportationtedcnology that makes possible far
more effective transnational organizing by these human rights groups than was
possible only two decades ago. Both communications and faster and lower cost
transportation technology, by making possible frequent, well attended international
conferences, have contributed to the growth of another strand in the rights revolution,
transnationalissue networks," energized by "epistenic conmnunities" of like-minded rights
advocates in nongovernmental groups, sympathetic governments, academia, and the
media, who work together across national and professional boundaries to promote
shared values and agendas. 6
Some remaining strands include domestic constitutions and laws, which
increasingly incorporate international norms,' national human rights institutions,
established in dozens of countries in the last fifteen years, spreading democratization.'
and gradually extended rule of law. This list is not all-inclusive but merely points out
14. See generally, William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rtghss 'A Curius
Grapevine7 (St Martin's 1998). John I Bolton and others sharply criticize the role of human rights
nongovernmental organizations. See, for example, John I Bolton, A ould We T:e CL!al Gonm.arze
Seriously?, 1 Chi J Intl L 205, 215-18 (2000). This essay is nor the place to join that debate. The
point here is simply that NGOs are a vital strand in the rope that pulls human rights.
15. See, for example, Kathryn Sikkinl, Human Rights: princip!ed issue.netwarhs and soragnty m Latzn
America, 47 Ind Org 411 (1993); Margaret E.Keck and Kathryn Silkink, Aeutists Br r Brders:
Advocacy Networks in InternationalPolitics (Cornell 1998).
16. For a general discussion on epistemic communities, see Peter M. Haas, ed, Kno!edje. Po:-er, and
InternationalPolicy Coordination,46 Inl Org 1 (1992).
17. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights in Nationalarnl
1n1er.atz:nal
Law, 25 Ga J Intl & Comp L 287 (1995-96); H tor Fix-Zamudio, El Dercha Internacrnnalde 1:s
Derecbos Humanos en las ConstitucionesLatinoatnericanasy en la Corte Interanericanade Derec:sHumanes,
in Antonio A. Cancado Trindade, The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honr= of Th:mas
Buergenthal 159 (Inter-American Institute on Human Rights 1996); Paul V. Kahn, Srdhai., Law to
Power PopularSovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order,1 ChiJ Intl L 1,14-15, n 27
(2000). Also consider, id at 14-15, n 28. One analysis of Argentinas less than fully successfil
experience with constitutional incorporation of human rights treaties argues perceptively A
successful internalization strategy must be a dynamic, multifaceted process that engages a myriad of
transnational actors from social, political, as well as legal, spheres: Janet Koven Le-itr, Th:
Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 Colum JTransnad L 281
(1999). Her critique is consistent with the argument here that human rights advances are pulled
forward not by any single strand, but by a rope of interrelated strands. No one strand by itself is
generally sufficient.
18. See, for example, Freedom House, Democracy's Century: A Surry of Gldbal Pc!ttwl Chanes md: 20:b
Century, available online at <hrrp://www'freedomhause-orglreparts/centuryhnntl> (isired Mar 25,
2001).
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some of the strands comprising this "rope." The purpose here is to recognize how
international human rights law interweaves with these other strands, all growing both
independently and in their relations with each other, to create an ever stronger rope
that pulls international human rights forward. Other strands in the rope include the
growing levels of affluence and education in most parts of the world,19 expansion in the
number and reach of nonbinding international norms," and, of course, the explosive
growth of international human rights law itself.
III. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
ON RIGHTS PROTECTION

Does the necessity to bring in other factors suggest that international law, by
itself, counts for little? For that matter, with all these other rights-protecting
processes, who needs international law?
What such questions overlook is that all the foregoing processes of rights
protection-including international human rights law-are interrelated and, over
time, growing stronger. All the others are strengthened by international human rights
law, which in turn is strengthened by each of them. Human rights groups, for
example, make constant use of international human rights law in their organizing.
National human rights ombudsmen regularly appeal to international norms in
opposing local efforts to legislate lower standards. Constitutional courts increasingly
look to international treaties and the jurisprudence of international courts in
interpreting national constitutional rights.
In this process of mutual reinforcement, international law plays several
distinctive roles:
(A) Provides a common language. Rights groups in Thailand and Chile, New York
and Johannesburg, can invoke the same set of rights expressed in the same language,
interpreted by the same UN human rights bodies. In theory, this function could be
played by nonlegal instruments. Indeed, at the outset of the modern rights revolution,
it was played by the Universal Declaration, that instrument arguably evolved into
19. See, for example, UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 1998 19 (1998)
(combined primary and secondary school enrollment in developing world more than doubled in last
30 years).
20.

See generally Shelton, ed, Commitment and Compliance (cited in note 12), and especially the chapters
on human rights by.Erika B. Schlager, A Hard Look at Compliance with "Soft" Law: The Case of the

OSCE 346-72; Francis Maupain, International Labor Organization: Recommendations and Similar
Instruments 372-93; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law at 393-418; Christopher
McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: The Sullivan and McBride Principles
418-49; Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions 449-63. In accord with the initial protocol of
the research project, my own contribution used the term "soft law"; I am now persuaded by Richard
Bilder's critique that a better term is the one eventually adopted for its title, namely "non-binding
norms." Richard B. Bilder, Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate, in Shelton, ed, Commitment
and Compliance at 65, 71-72 (cited in note 12).
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customary international law. This function, then, is a by-product rather than a
necessarily unique function of international human rights law. Nonetheess, in
practice, the instruments of international law supply most of the vocabulary for
transnational rights discourse.
(B) Reinforces the universality of human rights. Three quarters or more of all
governments accept the main international human rights treaties: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; UN treaties on rights of women and children
and against racial discrimination; basic ILO treaties on labor rights; and the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols on international humanitarian law. The numbers grow
every year. Such broad participation in formally binding international instruments
reinforces the claim that human rights are universal. This, in turn, strengthens their
claim to being fimdamental and hardens their currency in domestic and international
political debate.
While most widely adopted instruments are legally binding, not all are. For
example, the Universal Declaration not only asserts its universality, but has repeatedly
been adopted without formal dissent, first by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and
later by widely attended, UN-sponsored diplomatic conferences in 1968 and 1993.
Thus, again, the contribution of international human rights law to universality, even if
not unique, is an important by-product.
(C) Legitimizes claims of rights. Because international human rights treaties are
adopted by governments, usually after prolonged and contested negotiations and
followed in many countries by lengthy processes of ratification, they confer legitimacy
on claims of rights, especially when those claims are asserted (as they usually are)
against governments.' Human rights groups can (and regularly do) say to
governments, "Itis not we who say that torture is illegal and must be investigated and
punished; it is you who so declare, as parties to the Convention Against Torture."
(D) Signals the perceived will of the international community. Because of broad
participation by governments, via formally serious processes of negotiations and
ratifications, international human rights treaties are often perceived as expressing the
will of the international community. While that perception may matter little in a
powerful country such as the United States, it often carries considerable weight in
smaller and weaker countries-which is to say, most of the world's nations.
During peace negotiations in Guatemala in the mid-1990s, for example, the
military pressed for a blanket amnesty for its wartime violations of human rights.
Human rights groups had few cards to play in opposition, other than the argument
that under international law, amnesties could not be conferred for certain crimes
against humanity. In need of international approval and financial support for post-war
21. See generally the works of Thomas Franck. inctuding. Thomas M. Frantc. Fairnessm InteratinzA
Law and Institutions (Clarendon 1995); Thomas M. Franck, Te Potter of Le tiraqy Among Nations
(Oxford 1990); Thomas M. Franclk, Letimacy in the
InternationalSystern, 82 AmJ Ind L 705 (1988).

Spring 2001

ChicagoJournafofInternationafLaw

recovery programs, the government ultimately agreed to leave such crimes out of the
amnesty. The perception that violating international law would flout the will of the
international community-or at least that it could be so characterized by
opponents-was a major factor in this decision." Only crimes whose prosecution is
arguably required by international law were exempted. Those for which amnesty
would merely offend international sensibilities were not exempted.
Perceived international will also plays a role in the tendency of newly democratic
regimes to ratify human rights treaties and accept international enforcement
mechanisms, as a kind of insurance policy against the return of authoritarian rule."
Most recently, no sooner did Peru oust the regime of President Alberto Fujimori,
who had purported to withdraw the country from the contentious jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, than the new government promptly rejoined the Court.24
(E) Providesjuridicalprecision. Especially when international human rights law is
put in treaty form, by which governments expect to be bound, negotiators strive to
give it a degree of juridical precision generally lacking in political declarations and
philosophical pronouncements. The room for debate as to its meaning-and hence
pretense for evasion, or grounds for needless disagreement-is narrowed.
(F) Creates increased expectations of compliance. Because international human rights
law is expressed as law, it generates increased expectations of compliance. This gives
human rights claimants stronger ground to demand compliance, and narrows the
defenses available to violators: they may deny that violations were committed, but they
cannot easily deny their obligation to respect the relevant norm. A government may
well have accepted an international obligation with no intention to comply, but this is
a difficult thing to admit publicly. The government may find itself trapped by its own
hypocrisy.
(G) Encourages domestic judicial enforcement. International human rights law,
especially in treaty form, is susceptible to domestic judicial enforcement, whereas nonlegal instruments generally are not. Many constitutions, for example, expressly

22. See Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for
Atrocities, 59 L & Conremp Probs 197,222-24 (Aut 1996).
23. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: DemocraticDelegation in Postwar Europe,
54 Intl Org 217 (2000).
24.

Consider Douglass Cassel, Peru Withdrawsfrom the Court: Will the Inter-American Human Rights System
Meet the Challenge?, 20 Hum Rts L J 167 (1999); BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Congress
Approves Rejoining Inter-American Court of Human Rights Uan 15, 2001) (reporting congressional action
on Jan 12, 2001), available on Lexis; James Morrison, Embassy Row: Peru Rejoins Court, Wash Times
A12 (Feb 2, 2001).
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incorporate treaties into domestic law,' and some accord special, higher domestic legal
status to human rights treaties.
(H) Encourages enforcement by international courts or agencies. Because international
human rights law is couched as law, it also lends itself to potential enforcement by
international courts or agencies-a trend growing in practice. Outside Europe such
enforcement is rare and even more rarely effective. Still, the mere threat or perception
(even mistaken) of its potential gives human rights groups added leverage. Indeed, the
very uncertainty of enforcement makes governments nervous. The uncertainty is
aggravated by the trend toward increasing enforcement in new and unexpected
ways-witness the surprise arrest of Chile's General Pinochet on a Spanish arrest
warrant in London, or credit denials by the World Bank on human rights grounds,
after decades of contending that the Bank could not consider human rights. Riskaverse diplomats and bureaucrats often treat slaps on the wrist, administered by
toothless international human rights bodies, as if they were matters to be taken
seriously, precisely because they never know when such seemingly empty words may
come back to haunt them.
(I) Creates additional stigina. International human rights law, especially
international criminal law norms such as those proscribing crimes against humanity,
adds to the moral sting and shame of violation. Granted, atrocities generate broad
condemnation on moral grounds alone. Even so, in many cultures-including the
culture of international diplomacy-criminal conduct carries its own, additional
stigma, undermining the capacity of violators to defend their conduct, while
enhancing the force of condemnations.'
(J) Avoids moral relativism. State violence does not always provoke moral outrage.
Populations victimized by opposing ethnic or rebel groups may tolerate, if not
applaud, brutal retaliation. Yet in such situations international law, written for
universal application, can keep its bearing. Even while few Peruvians, for example,

25. See Hannum, 25 GaJ Ind & Comp L (cited in note 17); Fix-Zarnudio, DtPeoh3 Intm..uztnal at 159
(cited in note 17); Kahn, 1 Chi J Ind L at 14-15, n 27 (cited in note 17); Levitt. 37 Colun J
Transnatl L (cited in note 17).

26. For example. Article 46 of the Constitution of Guatemala (1985) provides,*Premtrnene ef
International Law. The general principle is established that in matters of human rights, treaties and
conventions accepted and ratified by Guatemala, have preeminence over internal law. (Trans by
author). For other examples, see Constitution of Argentina (1994) Art 75.22 (Treaties have
"constitutional hierarchy above laws); Constitution of Ecuador (1998) Art 163 (treaties pre-ail over
laws); Constitution of El Salvador (1982) Art 144 (same).
27. It is an overstatement to argue that 'it is the moral quality of the act, and not its legal validiry, dat
provokes such criticisms. When shaming works, it is the perceived moral quality of the shamed
practice, and not its illegality, that matters.* Goldsmith, 1 Chi J Ind L at 338 (cited in note 1). It

should also be recognized that "[t]he moral content of international relations is being absorbed by
claims of legal rights, leaving less and less room for morally driven politics outside of Law Kahn, 1
ChiJ Ind L at 15 (cited in note 17).
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protested the prison massacre of rebellious Shining Path guerrillas, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights ruled against Peru's resort to excessive force.'
Similarly, after the Knesset failed to stop torture of Palestinian security suspects, the
Israeli Supreme Court finally ended the practice.' And while few Israelis today
protest their government's selective assassinations of security suspects, Amnesty
International rightly denounces these violations of international law." Where moral
clarity may be lost in the passions of the moment, international law can not only
condemn, but also teach, helping morality to regain its compass.
To some degree, as noted, these attributes of international law are not necessarily
unique. Precision might be demanded, for example, even in a political declaration. But
in practice this unique combination of attributes-commonality of terms, near
universality of formal acceptance, legitimacy of adoption, perceived reflection of
international will, relative normative precision, increased expectations of compliance,
susceptibility to domestic legal enforcement, potential and uncertainty of international
enforcement, the additional stigma of violation, and moral clarity-enables
international human rights law to make a distinctive contribution in support of
growing human rights consciousness, organizing, and national legal and institutional
development.
Each of the other strands, in turn, reinforces the reach and credibility of
international human rights law. Public human rights consciousness gives international
human rights law more teeth, by imposing a cost on most governments-again
excepting the most powerful-of openly violating or being credibly accused of
violating international human rights law. Nongovernmental organizations are often
the main users of enforcement procedures and the main lobbyists for stronger treaties

28. See Neira Algeria, Sep 19, 1996 (Inter-Am Ct Hum Rts), in Ann Report of the Inter-Am Ct of Hum Rts
1996 179, 183 para 21, 186 paras 44-45 (OAS 1997).

29. SeeJudgment on the InterrogationMethods Applied by the GSS, Nos HC 5100/94, HC 4054/95, HC
6536/95, HC 5188/96, HC 7563/97, HC 7628/97, HC 1043/99 (Sup Ct of Israel, sitting as the
High Court ofJustice, Sep 6, 1999), available online at
<http://www.court.gov.il/mishpat/html/en/verdict/judgment.rtf > (visited Mar 25, 2001). The

Court noted that its prohibition of brutal or inhuman interrogation techniques "isin perfect accord
with (various) international Law treaties-to which Israel is a signatory-which prohibit the use of
torture ... These prohibitions are 'absolute.' There are no exceptions to them and there is no room
for balancing." Id para 23.

30. See Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: State Assassinations and Other Unlawful
Killings (Al 2001) (citing both treaties and nonbinding UN codes of conduct), available online at
<http://www.web.amnesy.org/ai.nsf/index/MED150052001> (visited Mar 25,2001).
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and enforcement procedures.3 ' National human rights ombudsmen and courts, too,
give international law greater currency and credibility by invoking it.
Reinforced by these interactions, international human rights law is then even
better positioned to contribute legitimizing force to these other institutions. In other
words, the interactions among strands in the rope are mutually reinforcing. The fll
impact of international human rights law is not limited to its initial, indirect impact
on rights protection, through its strengthening of other strands in the rope, but also
includes a secondary impact, made possible by the reinforcement it receives from the
other strands.
Quantifying the ultimate benefit for rights protection of all these interacting
processes, or even demonstrating a clear qualitative impact, would require an
enormously sophisticated methodology, coupled with a herculean effort to gather a
range of data, much of which may not exist or may not be reliable. Perhaps some day
such an ambitious research agenda will be attempted. In the meantime, judgment,
based on experience, and tested for plausibility against the leading international
relations-international law theories, is the best guide for policy.
One way to detect the distinctive, indirect role of international law is to assume
its absence. Without international human rights law-with only national laws or
international philosophical declarations-could we count on a comparable degree of
universality, legitimacy and precision in human rights norms, and of stigma and risk of
potential sanction for viohtions? One would be hard pressed to make that case.

IV.

DIRECT IMPACT

Account should also be taken of the growing, non-negligible, direct impact of
international human rights law. Unquestionably the direct impact has been greatest in
Europe, where it has grown recently and rapidly in a hospitable climate of democratic
values and regional unification.
In the Council of Europe, which has grown from the post-war democracies of
Western Europe to its current embrace of some forty European states, the European
Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1950 and came into force in 1953. Not
until the 1970s, however, did its enforcement institutions-the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights-have much business. After gaining public
and governmental trust, they expanded their dockets and effectiveness from the mid1970s on. 2 By 1990 the European Court had come to play for Europe approximately
the same role in safeguarding approximately the same set of basic rights, as the US
31. 'Over the course of a generation, human rights activists-inside and outside of governmentsgained control of the agenda for the creation of substantive law." Kahn, 1 ChiJ Intl L at 13 (cired in
note 17).

32. Consider Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a T.ory of Efftaie Suprar.'wral
Adjudication, 107 Yale LJ 273 (1997).
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Supreme Court plays in enforcing constitutional rights among
the fifty states, with
33
of compliance.
comparable substantive outcomes and degrees
As a result ofjudgments of the European Court of Human Rights, not only have
individual plaintiffs been awarded damages, but European governments have revised
legislation on such sensitive matters as media criticism of judicial proceedings,
national security measures against terrorists," gay rights," family rights,' and crimina
justice procedures. The direct impact of international human rights law in Europe is
not only comparable to that of domestic constitutional law in developed democracies,
but greater than that of domestic law in nations where the rule of law has yet to take
hold or is crippled by corruption.
While the European Court of Justice of the European Union mainly deals with
economic and regulatory issues, it, too, has rendered important and effective rulings
on such matters as gender discrimination and rights of immigrants.3 9
Outside Europe, however, the direct impact of international human rights law
has been sporadic. The UN human rights system-developed largely since the mid1970s through state reporting requirements, special rapporteurs and experts who
investigate and publish reports, and individual complaint procedures under several
treaties-has been a useful strand in the rope of human rights protection. It indirectly
protects rights by reinforcing public awareness, exposing violations, legitimizing
efforts by nongovernmental organizations and keeping issues of human rights on
diplomatic agendas." Beyond a few exceptions-its contribution to the fall of
apartheid in South Africa; human rights components of peacekeeping missions in
countries ranging from El Salvador to East Timor; ad hoc international or partly
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone;
and occasionally successful interventions in individual cases by rapporteurs and treaty

33.

Consider Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 Conn J Intl L 39, 39 (2000) (The
European human rights system is "remarkably efficacious, but it is far from (anything but relatively)

perfect.").
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Sunday Times v UK, 30 Ser A: Judgments and Decs (Eur Ct of Hum Rts 1979).
See, for example, Ireland v UK, 25 Ser A: Judgments and Decs (Eur Ct of Hum Rts 1978).
See, for example, Dudgeon v UK, 45 Ser A:Judgments and Decs (Eur Ct of Hum Rts 1981).
See, for example, Marckx vBelgium, 31 Ser A:Judgments and Decs (Eur Ct of Hum Rts 1979).

38.

See, for example, De Cubber v Belgium, 86 Ser A: Judgments and Decs (Eur Ct of Hum Rts 1984).

39. Consider Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas, eds, The European Union and Human Rights
(Marinus Nijhoff 1995).
40. Even while objecting to it as "fundamentally illegitimate," John Bolton notes that "[tihe real agenda
of the [UN death penalty] rapporteur and his allies ...is to leverage the stature and legal authority
of the United Nations (such as they are), into our domestic debate." Bolton, 1 Chi J Intl L at 215
(cited in note 14). He thus illustrates how international law interacts with other strands in the
human rights rope. While the UN may have little "pull" in the US, its "stature and legal
authority"- and hence its pull-are higher in most other countries. Id.
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committees-the UN's direct impact on rights protection has been exceedingly
modest.
Two other regional systems merit mention. During the Cold War it could fairly
be said that the Organization of American States had an ineffectual human rights
declaration since 1948, a mostly ineffectual Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights since 1959, and an Inter-American Court of Human Rights with no
contentious caseload since 1979. Such successes as the system could daim-for
example, documentation and exposure of Argentina's "dirty war" in 1980-were more
diplomatic than legal in nature.
By the late 1980s, however, the Inter-American Human Rights legal system
began to make claims of direct impact.41 In 1988, ruling under the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court delivered the first of what
are now a score of significant damage awards against states for violations of the right
to life, and there are many more cases currently on its docket. Governments also
began to accept substantial damage awards in settlement negotiations with the
commission. In the 1990s the commission and court began regularly to issue requests
and orders for "precautionary measures" by governments to protect the lives of dozens
of human rights defenders and witnesses. In nearly all these cases, security measures
were taken or offered, and in nearly all, the intended beneficiaries were not thereafter
killed.4
The court's orders also appear to have freed at least two vrongfully imprisoned
persons.' 3 They also led to the restoration to Peruvian media owner Baruch Ivcher
Bronstein of a TV station wrongly taken from him by the Fujimori regime, after the
station criticized the regime's involvement in corruption and torture..m In addition, in

41.

Consider Thomas Buergenthal and Douglass Cassel, Te Future of &.e Inter-American Human Riihis

System, in Juan E. Mindez and Francisco Co-, eds, El Futuro del Sistema Interamer car.o de Prrecrtnd
los Derecbos Humanos539 (Inter-Am Inst on Hum Rts 1998).

42. One cannot know for certain whether each intended beneficiary would have survived in any event.
But in view of the dangerous circumstances typically presented in such cases, and the high level
attention that precautionary measures generally command from government officials, it islikey that
these international interventions contributed to saving at least some lives, and perhaps many.
43. On September 17, 1997, the court ordered Peru to release the victim from prison "%ithin a
reasonable time Loayza Tamayo Sep 17, 1997 in 2 Inter-Am YB on Hum RLs 2184, 2264 para 84,
2266 para 5 (Martinus Nijhoff 1997). On October 16, 1997, Peru did so. See Lea)za Tamayo para
106(A)(k), 42 Ser C Decs and Judgments (Inter-Am Cc Hum Rxs 1998). See also Suarez Roweto
Nov 12, 1997, in Ann Report of the Inter-Am Ct on Hun: Res 1997 283, 286 para 15 (OAS 1993).
44. See Ivcber Bronstein Case paras 51, 55, 76z, 76aa. 174,179-80 (Inter-American Court on Human
Rights Feb 6,2001), available online at

<http://www.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/SERIEC/C._74_ESP.HT > (visited Mar 25, 2001);
Cassel, 20 Hum Rrs LJ 167 (cited in note 24); Lucien Chauvin, Peru Reinstates Ousted Statn O&i'ws,
Variety 58 (Dec 11-17,2000).
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the 1990s, national courts in Latin America have begun to follow the jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court in rights cases, resulting in modifications of national law."
In terms of real operation, the Inter-American human rights legal system is thus
little more than a decade old. But it has become consolidated-all Spanish- and
Portuguese-speaking nations in Latin America (except Cuba) now accept the binding,
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. Its output is growing, as is the
degree of state compliance. Although its direct impact remains far short of that of the
European Court, the Inter-American system can claim solid achievements and shows
promise.
The African regional system remains at an earlier and less effective stage of
development. The African Convention of Human and People's Rights came into
force only in 1986. It created an African Commission which has limited powers and
did not begin to function until the 1990s, when it began reporting cases with little or
no impact on the real world. Under South African leadership, African states recently
agreed to establish an African Court of Human Rights. As yet, the direct impact of
the African system is negligible. The question is whether, like the Inter-American
system, it may slowly evolve into a system capable of making meaningful contributions
to rights protection.
V. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN PERSPECTIVE

In evaluating the direct and indirect impact of international human rights law on
rights protection, at least three further perspectives should be borne in mind. One is
that of relative utility: the issue is not whether international human rights law achieves
its lofty objectives or even comes close. Rather, the question is whether it is a useful
tool for human rights protection activities carried out by nongovernmental
organizations, the press, government agencies, and courts. Plainly the users of the
tool-human rights activists, advocacy journalists, ombudsmen, and human rights
litigators-testify by their regular use that they find it to be of value in their efforts.
A second perspective is that of history. As historical movements go, international
human rights laws and the international human rights movement are still in their
relative infancy. Until 1945, human rights was generally considered to be a matter
within the exclusive domestic sovereignty of states. The first significant conceptual
breakthrough, a vague "internationalizing" of human rights, came only with the
United Nations Charter of 1945. The first international bill of rights came only with
45. See, for example, Case of R6ger Ajan Blanco, Motion of Unconstitutionality no 421-S-90, Sentence no
2313-95 (Sup Ct Costa Rica, Const Chamber May 9, 1995) (striking down compulsory licensing of
journalists); Ekmnedian v Sofovicb, case E 64 XXIII (Sup Ct Just Argentina, July 7, 1992) (right of
reply), in 3 JurisprudenciaArgentina 199 (Jurisprudencia Argentina 1992). Also, consider Levitt, 37
ColumJ Transnatl L 281 (cited in note 17).
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the Universal Declaration in 1948. The principal human rights treaties, the
International Covenants, were not adopted until 1966 and did not enter into effect,
with only 35 ratifying states, until 1976. Enforcement mechanisms under both the
UN Charter and the main human rights treaties did not begin to take generalized
effect until the late 1970s and have grown steadily since then. Except for the postWorld War II trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo (which fell well short of current
human rights standards), international prosecutions of human rights violators have
developed only within the last decade.
International human rights law and institutions, then, are still rapidly growing. It
is far too soon to assess their effectiveness at maturity. What they have already
achieved in their fledgling state is, arguably, remarkable.
A third perspective is that of variable context. That is, the effectiveness of the
international human rights law strand-and indeed of the entire rope of the
international human rights movement-varies tremendously with context. Where
wars are underway or governments dictatorial, rights protection is usually ineffective
in the short term. Where governments are powerful globally (the US, China, Russia)
or regionally (India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Brazil), they are relatively impervious to
external human rights pressures, legal or otherwise. Even if international human rights
law helps to nudge much of the world toward greater respect for rights, it cannot be
expected to work in all times and all places.
VI. CONCLUSION

The direct impact of international human rights law on practice in most of the
world remains weak and inconsistent. But both this incipient body of law, and to a
lesser degree its direct and even more its indirect influence on conduct, have grown
rapidly in historical terms, and appear to be spreading in ways that cannot be
explained by a worldview based solely on state power and rational calculations of selfinterest. To appreciate its effectiveness and potential, international human rights law
must be understood as part of a broader set of interrelated, mutually reinforcing
processes and institutions-interwoven strands in a rope-that together pull human
rights forward, and to which international law makes distinctive contributions. Thus
understood, international law can be seen as a useful tool for the protection of human
rights, and one which promises to be more useful in the future.
By promoting international human rights law, the US can make this body of law
more useful for rights victims worldwide. On the other hand, by opposing and
denigrating it, the US weakens not only international law, but the full range (the
entire rope) of interrelated cultural, organizational, institutional and political supports
for expanded protection of human rights in the world. Considering the stakes in
human lives and dignity, international human rights law deserves a place of respect in
US domestic and foreign policy debates.
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